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One of the thornier problems for naturalism is how to understand relig-
ion and God. On the one hand, naturalism rests on the assumption that
whatever there is, it is fully a natural entity. This means, among other
things, that neither nature in general nor anything in or of it requires for
its being or explanation anything that is not natural. This on the face of
it rules out the possibility of any traditional conception of the divine
wherein the divine is non-natural, or supernatural, or the cause of na-
ture, or the sustainer of nature, or for that matter the redeemer of na-
ture. So much, one would think, for God and religion.
 The problem is “the other hand,” which is to say that if naturalism
takes the view that whatever there is, it is fully encompassed within na-
ture, then there seems to be a necessity to understand both God and
religion as natural phenomena. Religion is certainly a reality, and natu-
ralism must be able to understand it given its character and role within
orders of nature. God is a trickier matter. If we say that there is a God
that is the first cause, so to speak, whether in time or in being, then we
have posited a non-natural entity and have moved outside of naturalism.
If we say that there is a God but that God is fully a natural being then it
is not clear that we are talking about the God which appears to motivate
believers within the major monotheistic traditions. This fully natural
God, for example, could not be a first cause in any sense.
 One way around the problem of God is simply to deny God’s exis-
tence, i.e. to say that though millions of people assert and through his-
tory  have  asserted  the  existence  of  God,  and  claim  in  a  wide  range  of
ways to feel God’s presence in their lives, they are all simply wrong. It is
of course possible that they are all wrong, in that there is no logical in-
consistency with most people or even everyone holding a view that turns
out to be false. And in fact a naturalist has to say something like this, i.e.
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that the God in whom millions of people have believed and continue to
believe does not now and never has existed.
 But there remains something unsatisfactory about this because to talk
about God in this way seems not to take account of the significance the
belief in God has for many people. To talk about God’s existence is not
simply to make one more existential claim, on a par with, for example,
talking about a monster in a child’s closet. The meaning and significance
for people’s lives of the belief in the existence of God is a dimension or
trait of God itself, and therefore God’s existence can not be breezily
waved aside without equally breezily waving aside the power that belief
in God has. It is precisely here that the naturalist has to be careful; the
power and significance of the belief in God is a dimension of the phe-
nomenon that is to be accounted for on natural terms, and so cannot
simply be dismissed.
 The focus of this paper is to consider some of the many aspects of
religion such that we understand them within a naturalist framework
without simply dismissing them or distorting their character. This is
important because one of the virtues of naturalism in general is that it is
capable of encompassing the many dimensions of experience, and of
nature  generally,  without  the  reductionism  that  is  all  too  common  in
much of philosophy. It would not do simply to dismiss the belief in God
as an illusion, as we have said. It will also not do simply to reduce reli-
gious commitment and faith to social or psychological conditions. Freud
may or may not have been right that religion is an illusion, or that belief
in God is a craving for a father figure, but even if he were right, religious
belief and faith are too central to individuals, communities and societies
to be explained away. It is more reasonable, and more consistent with the
tenor of naturalism, to attempt to understand them, to the extent possi-
ble, on their own terms. That “their own terms” tend to be supernatural
sets the philosophical challenge for us.
An Ordinal God
Over the years there have been various approaches to an understanding
of God and religion as natural phenomena. We shall stipulate, first, that
God prevails, which is to say that there are sets of relations in nature,
including experience, of which it is reasonable to say that God is a con-
stituent. This is a rather bald acknowledgment, though, in that it says
Naturalism and Religion   3
nothing about the traits that we may reasonably ascribe to God. It says
simply that there are ordinal locations of which God is a constitutive
trait, which is a more technical way of saying simply that God prevails in
some order or orders.1 This may appear to beg the question of God’s
existence in that it seems to assert the very thing that is at issue when one
asks whether God exists. First, as we will see again in the discussion of
Santayana below, the question of God’s existence has been given undue
importance in that it  misses the very senses in which God matters.  Sec-
ond, the term “existence” is in any case a tricky one. For us it has to mean
simply prevalence in one or more orders of relations. When one asks
whether God exists one is not simply asking whether there are any ordi-
nal locations at all in which God prevails. We must rephrase the tradi-
tional  question  whether  God  exists,  and  ask  whether  God  prevails  in
certain specific orders. To say, then, that God prevails in some order or
orders is not necessarily to respond in the affirmative to the meaning and
significance of the question whether God exists; it is not question beg-
ging.
 It  does,  however,  assume  that  we  cannot  simply  dismiss  God  alto-
gether, if only because our experience refuses to allow it. God has been a
factor in countless lives and events for thousands of years. Human his-
tory  and  individual  lives  would  be  radically  different  if  there  had  not
been a God motivating people to do this or that, or to act one way or
another. From the rapturous to the despicable, God has been involved in
much of what the human race has undergone, accomplished and com-
mitted.
 Notice that we do not say that the concept of God has motivated
people, but God itself. In doing so, are we not smuggling in through the
back door a kind of ontological argument? Or less grandiosely, are we
not equivocating between God and the concept of or belief in God? The
answer is that we are not, and the reason we are not may be one of the
more important philosophical points to be made here. First we should
distinguish between concepts and beliefs. Concepts do not generally
have much motivating power. For example, we might have a concept of
right and wrong such that doing x is right and not doing x is wrong.
1 The general ontological perspective that frames this discussion is a relational, ordinal
ontology associated with Justus Buchler. See Buchler 1966.
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However, if when faced with having to choose between them we do x,
we do so not because we have a specific concept of right and wrong in
this  case but because we have a commitment to doing right,  or because
we believe that doing right is the appropriate thing for us to do. It is the
belief or commitment that has the motivating power in such a case, and
not the concept. Similarly, if one were a Justice of the US Supreme
Court and had a certain concept of the US Constitution one would rule
in certain ways and not others. But it is not the concept that drives a
judge as much as it would be a commitment to the Constitution as the
foundational law of the country and the final arbiter of the legitimacy of
state and federal law. The concept may provide the criterion for one’s
decision, but it is not what motivates.
 The case is similar for religious motivation. It is not having the con-
cept of God that inclines us to go to war or to make peace, to found a
city or to follow a particular way of life. It seems more reasonable to say
that belief or faith may have this power than to say that a concept does.
We will deal further on with the difficult question of how to understand
religious faith. At this point we need to consider the question whether it
is  more sensible to say that God has figured in human behavior or that
the concept of or belief in God has done so. The distinction is important
because if the former is the case then we have sufficient justification to
talk about God as prevailing without having to make any prior argu-
ments about God’s existence.
 Let us face the question directly.  God and the belief  in God are not
the same thing. The latter is a mental or psychological condition, or at
least a predisposition to behave in certain ways under certain conditions,
while the former is a complex that might in principle be located in, or is
locatable  in,  any  number  of  orders  beyond  the  psychological  or
behavioral. When people pray, for example, the object of prayer is not
their belief in God, but God itself. When people write religious poetry or
music, it is in praise not of the belief in God but of God itself. God is the
object of these activities, not the belief in God. To say that the object of
such activities is a belief or a concept is to twist them into something
they are not. In the same way, Biblical or Koranic stories are stories
about  God,  not  stories  about  the  concept  of  or  belief  in  God,  just  as
Hamlet is a play about a Danish prince and Xanadu is  a  poem  about
Kublai Khan. The naturalist has no more reason to be unnerved about
Naturalism and Religion   5
the object of Biblical stories than he or she does about the object of the
work of Shakespeare or Coleridge.
 If considerations like these are not sufficient to make the point that
we  may  reasonably  talk  about  God  rather  than  simply  the  belief  in  or
concept of God, perhaps a stronger way to make it would be to empha-
size the phenomenological dimension of the experience of God. There
are  many  people  for  whom  God  is  a  presence  in  their  lives.  William
James more than anyone has demonstrated the many ways that such an
experience can occur. There are no doubt psychological dimensions to
religious experience, but if we are to avoid reductionism, it is not suffi-
cient to content ourselves by explaining away religious experience in
psychological terms any more than we can legitimately explain away the
relatively large in terms of the relatively small, or the biological in terms
of the chemical, or the social in terms of the individual. Religious experi-
ence has an integrity that is not to be denied and there is no philosophi-
cal justification for attempting to do so. Just as religious stories have an
object, so religious experience has one or more constituents that cannot
justifiably be written off. Religious experience is to be taken at face value,
and such experience invariably includes some sense of the divine. In
some  way  or  other  such  experiences  are  about  or  include  God,  under-
stood in various ways. They are not simply about beliefs or concepts.
 That is not to say that every possible interpretation of religious ex-
periences is equally valid, because interpretation involves other episte-
mological moves. Analogies may be more or less adequate; inferences
may be valid or not; references may be more or less accurate. It is surely
the case that in many religious experiences the inference to an appropri-
ate understanding or explanation is replaced by wishful thinking and
jumping to conclusions. The phenomenological dimension of religious
experience justifies talk about God, but it does not by itself justify the
attribution of any specific traits to God. The most we can say based on
the reality and integrity of religious experience, which is to say, based
solely on the phenomenological level, is that God prevails. To specify the
orders in which we may reasonably say that God prevails requires careful
philosophical analysis.
 God, we may then say, is discriminated, identified, picked out, and to
that extent we are justified in talking about God directly. And the orders
in which God is so discriminated indicate the respects in which it is ap-
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propriate to say that God prevails. To do so is not to equivocate between
God and belief in God. It is, on the contrary, to take seriously the fact
that it is God about which people write and speak, to which people pray,
and which people experience. We are well served to remind ourselves at
this point of John Herman Randall’s observation that the important
question is not whether this or that exists, but how and in what way it
exists (Randall 1958, 131). In no case is that insight more important
than with respect to God.
 Some philosophers in the American pragmatist and naturalist tradi-
tions have attempted to develop a conception of God, and of religion,
that can sit comfortably within a naturalist world view. Spinoza, perhaps
the most important pre-American example, equated God and nature,
and for doing so he was attacked for atheism. But Spinoza did manage to
maintain a degree of the humility and piety before nature that is charac-
teristic of the humility and piety common in religious experience and
observance. Such a sense of piety is often associated with a religious sen-
sibility, and Spinoza’s example indicates that what in his case is a natural
piety nonetheless captures something distinctive about religious experi-
ence.
 In the naturalist tradition the first key figure is Santayana, who
sought to understand and interpret the power and significance of relig-
ion and God, one consistent with naturalist assumptions, through an
aesthetic sensibility and a sense of the significance of the symbolic.
Dewey, in a more instrumentalist vein, offered an ethical reading of God
and religion, understanding and even maintaining the significance of
both while at the same time redefining them (Dewey 1934). In Dewey’s
hands God comes to represent the unification of the ideals that we hold
in highest esteem: justice, truth, beauty, wisdom, and benevolence. Ran-
dall took a still different approach, wherein both religion and God are
understood through the function they serve to provide coherence, mean-
ing and direction for people’s lives. In this respect Randall’s treatment of
religious and theistic themes is consistent with his ontological insight
that the important question is not whether this or that exists, but how
(Randall 1946).
 A fourth approach is taken by John McDermott, who gives the whole
set of issues what we might call a literary twist. McDermott often makes
the claim that there is no “canopy of explanation.” This is very much a
naturalist’s point of view in that it denies that there is an overarching
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story that neatly ties reality in a bow and provides whatever meaning we
may seek or need. But meaning and significance there still must be. So
what exactly is McDermott rejecting when he denies a canopy of expla-
nation or an overarching story? It is not the explanation or the story that
he rejects but the canopy. In fact he insists on a multiplicity of stories,
and it is in the stories that the important insights and understandings are
to be found. And the stories can be anything and come from anywhere;
they can be mythical, or heroic, or personal; they can derive from mem-
ory, invention, or the will, individual or collective. Whether God sur-
vives in this approach is an open question in that the stories may well be
stories  about  God,  but  the  function  of  God  surely  survives,  as  does  the
significance of a more traditional religious understanding (McDermott
1976; 1986; 2007).
 Another approach to the questions of God and religion within a
pragmatic naturalist framework has come from Robert Corrington, who
constructs a theology, in the traditional sense of an articulation of the
nature of God and spirit, with the help of the categories of an ordinal
ontology. Corrington is well versed, and consequently his theology,
though rooted in ordinality, crosses a number of lines of thought, includ-
ing Spinoza’s pantheism and Whitehead’s process theology (Corrington
1992; 1994).
 It would be valuable at this point to look a bit more closely at an out-
standing illustration of a naturalist’s approach to religion, and for that
purpose we turn to a discussion of Santayana. It is he, more than anyone,
whose insights into religion and the religious convey a sense of the sub-
tlety and understanding of which naturalist approaches to religion are
capable.
Santayana
George Santayana laid out the basic principles underlying his conception
of religion in a number of his works including Reason in Religion (1905),
Platonism and the Spiritual Self (1927), “Ultimate Religion” (1933), and
his novel Last Puritan (1935).
 For Santayana one’s religion is in the first place a kind of language,
the language one has as a result of a historical accident. Just as spoken
language has to be a particular language; religion has to be a specific relig-
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ion. The basis of the particular character of religion by analogy with lan-
guage can be related to Ferdinand de Saussure’s distinction of langage, la
langue and la parole. Saussure understands langage as “a system of signs
that express ideas,” which consists of two components: la langue, that is
the abstract system of language adopted in a given speech community,
and la parole, that is the concrete and individual act of speech. Santayana
sees all religions as positive and particular, as concrete historical forms of
general ideas. His view eliminates any justification for competition be-
tween religions because particular religions, though limited by their his-
toric nature, reflect the universal character of religion in general. Particu-
lar religion is a langue expressed in a number of discourses, i.e. paroles,
while  religion  per  se  is  “a  system  of  signs”  conveying  a  notion  of  a
broader context beyond the known world:
The vistas it [religion] opens and the mysteries it propounds are another
world to live in – whether we expect ever to pass  wholly into it  or  no – is
what we mean by having a religion (Santayana 1982, 6).
 Religion in the broad sense, while being a “vehicle or a factor in ra-
tional life” (Santayana 1982, 6), in its specific forms has some constrains
and limits. In Reason in Religion Santayana explores, on one hand, ra-
tionality and reason in religious thought and, on the other hand, shows
the resultant extremes of religious illusions taken literally. First and most
important, Santayana neither sets off religion and science, or intelli-
gence, nor religion and social order, or law, even if manifestations of
religious belief are far from being efficacious categories of action (Edman
1936, xxvii). On the contrary, he sees their common grounds:
We sometimes speak as if superstition or belief in the miraculous was disbe-
lief in law and was inspired by a desire to disorganise experience and defeat
intelligence. No supposition could be more erroneous. Every superstition is
a little science, inspired by the desire to understand, to foresee, or to control
the real world (Santayana 1982, 22).
Cult, e.g. prayer or sacrifice, is caused by practical feelings of need and
fear, and is linked to everyday reality. The practicality of motivations for
prayer or sacrifice demolishes the opposition of the supernatural and the
natural that is so often based on the presence or absence of rationality
and  reason.  Santayana’s  conception  of  religious  feeling  is  in  a  way  an
intuitive approach to the dynamic/static dichotomy rooted in Greek vs.
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Roman notions of chaos as a creative milieu (Greek), and as the realm of
the dead and a place of stagnation (Roman).
 Santayana, like other naturalist philosophers who have taken seri-
ously religion and its many issues, also deals with the question of God.
When people recognize the existence of an almighty power that exempli-
fies forces, which govern the fortunes of the psyche, they are led to the
belief that “faith is a rival, and more effective, method of thriving than
science and rational husbandry” (Hodges; Lachs 2000, 85). For Santa-
yana, who tries to find a way to overcome the constraints inherent in
dogmatic forms of religious belief, and determined by their historical
contexts, the higher power is not almighty but is omnificient,  i.e.  “the
doer of everything that is done” (Santayana 1936a, 285). Discriminating
between omnipresence, omnipotence and omnificence, Santayana links
omnipotence with stagnated forms of religion and associates ultimate
religion with omnipresent and omnificient power that serves as a source
of spirituality that is manifested in various phenomena. The omnipotent
almighty therefore is a historically and socially constructed idea:
Supernatural, then, as the ideal might seem, and imposed on human nature
from above, it was yet accepted only because nothing else, in that state of
conscience and imagination, could revive hope; nothing else seemed to offer
an escape from the heart’s corruption and weariness into a new existence
(Santayana 1982, 147).
For Santayana the roots of religion, and of Christianity as a historically
determined form, lie in the undeveloped character of human beings that
are not weaned from the need for authority:
Man is still in his childhood; for he cannot respect an ideal which is not im-
posed on him against his will, nor can he find satisfaction in a good created
by his own action. He is afraid of a universe that leaves him alone (Santa-
yana 1982, 91).
 If religion is understood as omnificient power then the question of
the existence of God looses its profundity, indeed its relevance. Proofs of
the existence of God are not needed, since God’s existence is either obvi-
ous or of no religious interest. The concept of God that is connected
with moral experience is of great moment, while it is of no religious in-
terest to hold a concept of God as an absolute in the physical world and
that is scientifically discoverable in nature or consciousness.
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 In his discussion of God and God’s existence Santayana comes very
close to the notion of concepts as dynamic elements of the mental map,
combining logic, culture, and linguistic parameters. He distinguishes
between knowledge of appearance as a separate entity and knowledge of
substance of which the appearance is a sign. Just as concepts are subject
to a process of change, “the stuff and texture of knowledge, its verbal and
pictorial terms, are flexible and subject to progressive correction. Thus
the notion of matter, of God, of human person, may continually vary”
(Santayana 1936a, 183–184). As the result, new fresh words can be nec-
essary to designate both a new conception and an old substance. For
Santayana it is irrelevant whether substance is called matter, or God, or is
given a different name. However, “controversy is misguided if it turns on
hypostatizing either idea, and asking which of them exists” (Santayana
1936a, 184). Santayana’s answer is that neither does. The very problem
of existence is extraneous because “what exists is the substance at work,
and this substance is never an idea hypostatized” (Santayana 1936a,
184). What Santayana has in mind is the existence of “concept” in the
sense of the later synergetic theories. This in turn explains his negation
of an unknowable substance, and that it is unknown is due to the confu-
sion of knowledge with intuition, i.e. with the study of an appearance
exclusive of its connection with the substance. The ignorance of this
connection and of the processive character of concepts leads to a situa-
tion wherein “not only would matter and God disappear from the scene,
but  the  whole  past  and  future  would  be  denied,  together  with  all  that
flux of experience which social intercourse, psychology, and history pre-
supposes” (Santayana 1936a, 186). The unknowable in Santayana’s
sense, akin to the “concept” in synergetic theories, is nothing but a proc-
ess of becoming; it is the formation of the concept that combines both
the elements of dynamics and of statics. That is why there is no castel-
lated form of conceptual knowledge:
The existence of this world […] is certain, or at least it is unquestioningly to
be assumed. Experience may explore it adventurously, and science may de-
scribe it with precision; but after you have wandered up and down in it for
many years, and have gathered all you could of its ways to report, this same
world, because it exists substantially and is not invented, remains a foreign
thing and a marvel to the spirit; unknowable as a drop of water is unknow-
able, or unknowable like a person loved (Santayana 1936a, 188).
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 The aspect of religious belief in its castellated form that Santayana is
opposed to is its linkage with human dependence on external higher
powers. Experience of human dependence generates moral laws that for
Santayana are not the core of religious feeling:
The conditions and the aims of life are both represented in religion poeti-
cally,  but  this  poetry  tends  to  arrogate  to  itself  literal  truth  and  moral  au-
thority, neither of which it possesses (Santayana 1982, 10).
Religious mythology, when it is erroneously used to substitute for ideal
values, in fact conflicts with moral truth. In other words, Santayana di-
vorces mythology and moral truth; he thinks that “rites can seldom be
made to embody ideas exclusively moral” (Santayana 1982, 38). Santa-
yana unequivocally distinguishes the spirituality of his ideal ultimate
religion from the morality that brings down and narrows the sphere of
religious discourse and sees moralities and religions as “dreadful an incu-
bus on the spirit  as  ever was the animal search for food,  love,  or safety”
(Santayana 1936c, 468). In The Last Puritan Santayana makes a meta-
phorical comparison of the moral order, i.e. attainable degrees of moral
life, with Jacob’s ladder. However beautiful, the image and the moral
order itself are still an imposition on the human mind because there is
“an obscure natural order in the universe, controlling morality as it con-
trols health: an order which we do not need to impose, because we are all
obeying it willy-nilly” (Santayana 1936b, 314). Viewed from a meta-
position and in the context of the universe at large, the moral nature of
humankind is no greater than the moral nature of an ant or a mosquito
(Santayana 1936b, 316). Therefore, “the attempt to subsume the natural
order under the moral is like attempts to establish a government of the
parent by the child” (Santayana 1982, 24).
 The true/false criterion is inapplicable to the religious discourse in its
ideal form since its function, as of poetic discourse, is interpretative. Re-
ligious statements are primarily and initially symbolic:
Our  worst  difficulties  arise  from  the  assumption  that  knowledge  of
existences ought to be literal, whereas knowledge of existences has no need,
no propensity, and no fitness to be literal. It is symbolic spontaneously [...].
What is more evident than that religion, language, all the passions, and
science itself speak in symbols; symbols which unify the diffuse processes of
nature in adventitious human terms that have an entirely different aspect
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from  the  facts  they  stand  for?  In  all  these  regions  our  thought  works  in  a
conventional medium, as the arts do (Santayana 1936a, 134–135).
Interpretations and symbolic knowledge have an advantage over
concrete  imperceptibles  because  they  do  not  include  occult  or
supernatural elements. For Santayana, as later for Susan Langer, symbol
is the ability to think with the help of a priori and rational forms without
any premise about the real existence of the object. Religion, like art, is
always interpretation, an attempt to catch “the spirit of the thing” (San-
tayana 1936a, 160). On the one hand, an aesthetic element is present in
a human being’s thoughts and actions; on the other, art possesses a reli-
gious dimension.
 Concrete historic forms of religion bounce between poles of fixed
laws and of vibrant imagination; the movement along the axis toward
the pole of imagination is the movement toward ultimate religion and
the life of reason, as “there is more need to stimulate fancy than to con-
trol it” (Santayana 1982, 12). “Religion is a form of rational living more
empirical, looser, more primitive than art” (Santayana 1982, 33) and the
value of religion lies in its the poetic character:
Religion remains an imaginative achievement, a symbolic representation of
moral reality which may have a most important function in vitalising the
mind and in transmitting, by way of parables, the lessons of experience
(Santayana 1982, 12).
 Viewing magic as the mother of art, Santayana associates religious
consciousness with the mythological. Incapacity of the primitive mind to
discriminate between the mythical and the scientific brought the mytho-
logical forms to life and made irrelevant the distinction between wisdom
and  myth  as  religious  content  (Santayana  1982,  31).  Belief,  in  Santa-
yana’s conception, is removed from the sphere of religion into the sphere
of science, as “myths are not believed in, they are conceived and under-
stood” (Santayana 1982, 50). To demand belief in an idea would mean
to deny the interpretative function of religious discourse and to assert
that the religious idea has scientific truth. Santayana understands myth
not as a story but as the specific form of consciousness characterized by a
certain perception of time, space and an absence of true/false and real-
ity/fiction oppositions:
Mythology cannot flourish in that dialectical air; it belongs to a deeper and
more ingenuous level of thought, when men pored on the world with in-
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tense indiscriminate interest, accepting and recording the mind's vegetation
no less than that observable in things, and mixing the two developments to-
gether in one wayward drama (Santayana 1982, 50).
 Developing the idea of religion as a poetic and mythological form of
consciousness Santayana emphasizes aesthetic dimension of spiritual life.
Santayana’s world is built not on morals but on beauty infiltrating every
aspect of life. While moral philosophy leaves little room for “aesthetics,”
Santayana’s “ultimate religion” is based on the ideas of beauty and har-
mony that replace the idea of an almighty God. The things are to be seen
from the perspective of the possibility of beauty they invoke. What San-
tayana argues for is neither religion, as “there is no faith invoked,” nor
philosophy, as there is no hypothesis about the nature of the universe or
knowledge (Santayana 1936a, 295). It is an aesthetic type of conscious-
ness based on the idea of the “eternal beauty, which lies sealed in the
heart of each living thing” (Santayana 1936a, 297), that he occasionally,
and perhaps misleadingly, calls religion or spirituality.
Faith
Religion has dimensions that concern cosmology, aesthetics, ethics, poli-
tics, meaning and purpose. It is small wonder that it has played a central
role in the lives of individuals, nations and whole cultures for, it appears,
as long as there have been people. Its centrality ebbs and flows, from the
more secular character of modern European societies to the theocracies,
real and desired, of the Middle East, to the Christian fundamentalism of
the US to the political commitments of Zionism. In one way or another
religion and religions have been and continue to be prepared to explain
and govern every aspect of individuals and our societies.
 Though it may seem ironic, we have taken a cue from Santayana in
suggesting that the simplest of the many dimensions of religion for the
naturalist to deal with is the cosmological and ontological. With respect
to cosmology, there is nothing gained in our understanding of the mate-
rial universe by positing an eternal, supreme being. We understand
enough about the workings of physical laws to do a fair job of accounting
for physical events in the universe, and we get better at it as we go along.
Of course physical laws do not explain the origins of the universe, but
then neither does an eternal being. If we can posit an eternal being out-
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side nature then we can just as easily posit the eternality of nature. The
one is no easier to understand than the other, but for the sake of simplic-
ity of explanation and with a nod to William of Ockham, there is no
point in multiplying entities unnecessarily.
 Ethics presents no great difficulty either. It is common for non-
philosophical theists to assume that ethical principles must have a divine
source for them to have any legitimacy, but we know that there is no
reason to accept that assumption. Those who assume that there must be
a divine or at least absolute source of ethical principles make one of two
mistake: either they assume that without an absolute source ethical prin-
ciples are arbitrary and therefore without sufficient justification, or they
reason that without the threat of punishment from a divine source there
would be no sufficient reason for people in adequate numbers to take
ethical principles seriously.
 The response to the first point is of course that there are at least sev-
eral bases for the justification of ethical principles other than an absolute
source, the most obvious of which is consequences. Another is purposes.
It is a given of pragmatist thought that we act to achieve something, or as
Dewey would put it, with ends in view. In many cases those ends or pur-
poses are related to ideals, and our ideals are in one way or another con-
structed both individually and collectively. Actions and their purposes,
or means and ends, are constitutively related to one another. Ethical
principles, like everything else, are complexes the characteristics of which
are determined relationally. Both their justification and their force are a
function of their relations.
 The second point is more easily dispensed with. First, as even theo-
logical ethicists will acknowledge, the threat of punishment is not an
ethically valuable reason for taking ethical principles seriously. That
many people seem to think that it is reflects more the inadequacy of edu-
cation than the nature of ethical principles. Second, experience demon-
strates otherwise because there are many atheists who live normally ethi-
cally informed lives. It is safe to say that theists and atheists are equally
capable of embodying and transgressing ethical principles.
 This is not to say that a naturalist ethics is a simple matter and pre-
sents no difficulties. But quantum physics is not easy either and presents
all sorts of difficulties, a fact that does not incline us to infer that the
better explanation of quantum behavior is divine. The examination of
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ethics is no less a natural enterprise than is the examination of material
nature.
 Certain  other  aspects  of  religious  belief  and  life  present  a  range  of
problems, though they are not philosophical problems. I have in mind
psychological questions and social and political issues. The latter can of
course be usefully considered by philosophers, for example the relative
advantages of secular democracy, or at least a secular polity of some kind,
over theocracy. But these questions are also grist for the mill of sociolo-
gists and political scientists. In other words, they pose no special problem
for naturalist philosophers.
 There are, as we have already suggested, questions of meaning and
purpose that are in no way trivial. To provide purpose and meaning is
perhaps the most important function religion serves. And it is not only a
psychological matter. Religious faith can and does provide the glue, we
might say, or the general framework that sustains individuals, families
and whole communities. The institution of the church or any religious
community plays a role here, but it is the belief of its members that con-
veys the moral authority on the church or community to serve the insti-
tutional function that it does. In other words, it is religious faith and
belief that serves as the source of meaning and purpose more than the
church. Santayana’s account of symbol and myth makes this point well.
 We know of course that meaning and purpose do not require reli-
gious belief, if only because there are many of us who live purposeful and
meaning-filled lives without it. But that understanding is shared by rela-
tively few of us, especially in the U.S. and other societies in which relig-
ion remains a potent force. Secularism may be more widespread in
Europe, but from a global perspective it is still more the exception than
the rule. And in any case meaning is a matter of creative construction
more than a given of nature.
 So the pragmatic naturalist can handle the bulk of issues that arise
around religion. With respect to ontology and cosmology, ethics and
aesthetics, society and politics, and meaning and purpose, pragmatic
naturalism can make sense on its own terms of the religiously oriented
questions that have traditionally been posed. But there remains one out-
standing question: what do we do in the face of straightforward religious
faith?
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 It is worth taking a moment to think about what religious faith is. I
suspect that we typically think of it as rather like any sort of belief, even
if more fundamental to people’s lives than most or all other beliefs. But
this is probably not right. Why, we might ask, do people believe things?
In some cases it is a matter of desire. We might believe that our favorite
team will win the championship because we wish it to be so. In other
cases we might believe something because we judge that there is enough
good reason to think it  true that we draw our belief  more or less  like a
deductive conclusion. In yet other cases we may believe something be-
cause our experience points toward it. But none of these kinds of situa-
tions adequately describe religious faith. It is not embraced by believers
as a conclusion to an argument, deductive or inductive, nor is it an infer-
ence drawn from experience. There is, however, one sense in which faith
is wishful thinking, so to speak, and that is the sense in which James deals
with it in “The Will to Believe.” James makes a compelling case in that
essay not for the claim that we ought to believe but for the more modest
but nevertheless important claim that given the conditions that apply in
the case of religious faith we are rationally justified in doing so if we are
so inclined, even in the absence of sufficient evidence. The appropriate
conditions, however, do not apply to most cases of belief, and so even
with respect to “willing” to believe, religious faith is unlike most other
forms of belief (James 1956).
 Anselm understood this fact about faith when he described his argu-
ment as  a  case of  “faith seeking understanding.” James understood it  in
“The Will to Believe” and in The Varieties of Religious Experience. Ran-
dall understood it in his many efforts to provide an account of the func-
tion of religious ideas and beliefs in people’s lives. And Santayana under-
stood it when he said that myths are conceived, i.e. that mythical think-
ing is its own conceptual framework. Religious faith, it appears, is not a
conclusion but a point of departure, a general framework for dealing
with whatever one faces.
 Neither the secularist naturalism nor religious faith can “best” the
other, so to speak, because neither is an inference. Argument is not rele-
vant at this conceptual level. It is senseless, in other words, for naturalism
to seek to refute faith. To attempt to do so is to betray a failure to under-
stand what it is. What it must do, on the contrary, is to recognize as a
fully  natural  phenomenon  the  fact  of  religious  faith  as  an  alternative
framework for many people’s lives. This, however, simply sets the prob-
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lem for us: naturalism must recognize religious faith as a natural phe-
nomenon, but religious faith, by virtue of some of its content, defeats or
at least is inconsistent with the naturalism that wants to acknowledge it.
 But perhaps this overstates the problem, or suggests more of a prob-
lem than there really is. If there is an inconsistency between faith and
naturalism, it arises only insofar as religious faith includes the belief in a
being that naturalism cannot incorporate, an absolute God. On the
point of this particular belief, however, there is nothing to prevent the
naturalist from simply disagreeing and claiming that the belief is mis-
taken  in  that  the  object  of  the  belief  does  not  exist.  That  is  to  say,  for
example, that there is not a God that prevails in the orders of creator ex
nihilo and ground of nature. To make such a claim would be no different
in kind than objecting to any other specific belief, no matter what its
object. This would be a problem for naturalism’s interest in acknowledg-
ing religious faith only if faith were reducible to these specific beliefs. But
faith cannot be so reduced.
 First, it is possible for faith to involve a belief in a God that is not
absolute, in which case there would not necessarily be an inconsistency.
If God can be construed as Dewey, Randall or Corrington have done and
remain religiously meaningful, then faith that includes such a belief
poses no special problem. The possibility and significance of faith in such
cases,  of  a  faith  that  incorporates  such  a  God,  becomes  a  theological
rather than a philosophical issue. Second, religious faith involves much
more than a set of beliefs, regardless of the traits attributed to the objects
of belief, and faith more fully understood presents no problem for natu-
ralism. This is the point that needs development.
 We can put the point in a slightly different way. If faith is primarily
belief in an absolute creator that stands outside of nature, then it is fun-
damentally flawed because its defining constituent is a false belief. But
must a life lived in faith be a mistake, however psychologically satisfying
it may be? This is the question we need to explore if we wish not to dis-
miss a life lived in faith but to understand its place in nature and in ex-
perience.
 In what does a life lived in faith consist? The first point to note is that
a life of faith is a way of life in the sense that it is about how one lives
rather than simply what one believes. There are several characteristics of
such  a  life  that  taken  together  make  it  clear  that  faith  involves  much
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more  than  simply  this  or  that  belief,  even  a  belief  in  God.  Among  the
characteristics that should be noticed, a life lived in faith is characterized
by trust in other people, by the sense of the actual or possible general
“rightness” of things, by a belief in salvation and redemption, by a sense
of and commitment to justice, and by a general posture of humility and
piety.
 There is of course a sense in which social life in general requires some
degree of trust. If for example we did not trust the other drivers on the
road, or the pilots of the airplanes we fly, or the teachers in our children’s
schools, then our lives in anything like their present form would not be
possible at all. But the trust that characterizes a life of faith goes much
deeper. A life defined by trust in other people is not primarily self-
interested, or at least is not a selfish life. If one trusts others, for example,
then one does not look to manipulate them to meet or fulfill one’s own
interests. That is not to say that religious faith makes one indifferent to
one’s own interests, but it does incline one to understand or pursue one’s
self-interest within the context of the interests of others. To trust in
other people is to act in ways that take for granted the moral significance
of those around one. It also inclines one to assume, with or without evi-
dence, that for the most part those around one to some extent take your
interests to heart. It is to assume a community that is based, usually in
unspecified ways, on common concerns and aspirations. For some such a
community can be fairly limited in scope, in the sense that it includes a
limited number of other people, while for others it can cast a much wider
net. Thus for some people their “faith community” is limited to those
who share a common confession, while for other people it can genuinely
encompass much or all of the world. People whose faith moves them to
work in distant and underdeveloped places in the world, for example,
can be understood to be moved by a trust in and commitment to others
in the latter, broader sense. Whether narrowly or broadly understood,
the trust in others that characterizes a  life  of  faith is  of  this  deeper sort
that not only enables social life but also defines one’s responsibilities
within it.
A sense of the “rightness” of things is a second characteristic of
the life of faith. What does this mean? Presumably one of the virtues of
belief in a God that orders the world is that one can assume that sooner
or later, if not already, things are ordered as they should be. This is what
Leibniz meant, though he offered the point in technical terms, when he
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said that this is the best of all possible worlds. Given all the serious prob-
lems we habitually face, from the mundane to the global, it is easy to
regard such a view as hopelessly naïve. Voltaire had himself a good time
doing just that. It is easy to laugh with Voltaire at Panglossian foolish-
ness, but we ought not to laugh too hard. It is not silly, or even entirely
unreasonable, to understand the world as in a process that ultimately will
work itself out for the best, either through God’s actions or our own. In
fact there is a sense in which we must take such a view, at least in a mod-
erate form. Our lives would be dismal indeed without some degree of
hope that the future can be an improvement on the present. Without
the assumption of such a possibility there would be little reason for us to
attempt to do anything constructive at all. It seems that when we act to
solve any problem big or small, we necessarily assume that the world and
our lives are meliorable. The difference between this common assump-
tion and the person of faith’s sense of the “rightness” of things is the
difference between meliorism and perfectibility. For most of us we need
assume only that our actions can achieve some desirable effect. For the
person of faith, however, the world is not only capable of becoming bet-
ter; it is inevitably becoming perfect, if it is not already. In the abstract
this is a very big difference, but it is worth noting that for practical pur-
poses it is more a difference of degree than of kind.
 Another dimension of a life lived in faith is the element of salvation
or redemption. This is the personal corollary of the previous point. Not
only is the world in general capable of perfection, but we as individuals
will, in one way or another, be redeemed. Theological traditions have
differed on this point. For some salvation is a result of what individuals
do, and for others it is a matter for an omnipotent God to determine.
Either way, for the faithful, personal salvation is a possibility, and some-
thing either to be worked toward or hoped for. A world in which one is
not irredeemable is one in which there is hope. A life of faith is a hopeful
life; faith imbues life with hope – for oneself, for the future, for “things”
in general. As with the other characteristics of a life in faith, there are
obvious virtues to a life lived in hope: hopefulness, even on purely prag-
matic grounds, is preferable to hopelessness.
 Yet another trait of faith is a sense of a pervasive justice in the world.
God is typically understood to embody justice himself, and that divine
justice is understood by the faithful to pervade God’s creation. Those
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who live a life of faith take it as a given not only that things happen for
reasons, but that the reasons are good ones because the events in the
world, and in one’s life, add up to something morally desirable. For many
people this sense of a cosmic justice is also translated into a personal
commitment to justice. Much of classical scripture in many religious
traditions is read this way, and whole theologies have been built around
the commitment to justice, social and individual, as the cornerstone of a
life of faith. In some cases, for example in Christian Liberation Theol-
ogy, the pursuit of justice that constitutes a life of faith has an overtly
political dimension. In other cases the commitment to justice may have
more personal and immediate implications than social. In either case, to
live a life of faith is to take seriously justice as a trait of creation itself and
the commitment to justice as a defining trait of one’s life.
 We have also mentioned humility and piety as characteristics of faith.
A life of faith will be one that avoids an arrogance and aggressiveness
toward nature itself and toward other people. If nature is understood to
be a divine creation then no other stance than humility towards it can be
appropriate. Natural piety, we may say, has a comfortable home in the
faithful life. Humility in one’s relations with other people is no less a
defining trait of faith. From a religious point of view people are no less
divine creations than the rest of nature, and that alone calls for humility.
In addition, if one is to take seriously the other traits of a life of faith that
we have discussed, for example justice and redemption, then consistency
if nothing else calls for humility before others. Both humility and piety
are expressions of a faith in the importance and inherent value of one’s
surroundings, of the environment in which one finds oneself. If I ap-
proach the world around me, and the people with whom I share it, as
inherently valuable, then I can have no other attitude than humility to-
ward them.
 Religious faith, then, is far more than a particular belief or even set of
beliefs.  It  consists  in  addition  of  a  set  of  attitudes  towards  the  world,
towards other people, and towards one’s own life that govern the deci-
sions one makes, the actions one takes, and in general the life one lives.
Faith  is,  therefore,  not  so  much  a  set  of  beliefs  as  a  way  of  life.  Specifi-
cally, it is a way of life that embodies trust, hope, justice, rightness, hu-
mility and redemption.
 For traditional religious faith this way of life and the traits that con-
stitute it  are bound up with a belief  in a creator God. If  a  creator God,
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indeed anything non-natural, is impossible, as we have argued, what
happens to our understanding of a life lived with these characteristics?
Or to ask again our overarching question, how are we to understand
faith?
 There are three logical possibilities: 1) A life so lived is impossible
without a creator God; 2) Such a life can be coupled with a God differ-
ently understood, one that makes sense within a natural world; and
3) Such a life  can be lived without any conception of God. The first  of
these possibilities is false on the face of it. It is certainly possible to live a
life of trust, hope, commitment to justice, humility and redemption
without a creator God, or without belief in one. It happens all the time,
and the fact that it happens all the time is the basis, we might add, for the
common ground that believers and non-believers have with respect to
many important individual and social issues.
 The second possibility speaks to the whole field of naturalist theology
to which we referred earlier. Whether any of the various conceptions of
God that have been developed by naturalist theologians are religiously
compelling is a question for others to answer. There is, as we have said,
nothing necessarily inconsistent about a theology developed within a
naturalist philosophical framework. It remains the task of the naturalist
theologian to indicate both the nature of a natural God and the charac-
ter of the religious life, or faith, within such a conceptual framework.
 The third possibility is, as we have already hinted in our response to
the first, the central point that needs to be made about an understanding
of faith appropriate to a philosophical naturalism. A life of faith is both
possible and can make perfectly good sense independent of religious
belief. Faith, in other words, is not something the naturalist needs to
ignore, dismiss, explain away, or in any way fear. The point is not that we
ought to live a  life  of  faith.  One lives one’s  life  as  one sees fit,  and other
things being equal there is not much to be gained by dictating to people
how they ought to live. The point is, rather, that the way of life that we
have described as constituting a life of faith makes perfectly good sense
on naturalist principles. There are, if nothing else, good pragmatic rea-
sons.  A  life  that  is  hopeful  and  committed  to  justice  is  more  likely  to
achieve some measure of satisfaction and “rightness” than a life of de-
spair and cynicism. Redemption and salvation too have pragmatic value.
Even when divorced from their more cosmic and eternal religious forms
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of expression, to understand ourselves, our lives and our world as savable,
as redeemable, is in fact a necessary condition for acting such that we
bring about better conditions than we currently have. And humility and
natural piety are not only possible independent of religious belief, but
given the current state of our environment and our social and political
relations, they may be necessary if we wish not to destroy ourselves and
our world.
 Faith, in other words, makes perfectly good sense, and a life so lived
may in fact be one that a naturalist can comfortably recommend. We
recognize of course that for the religious believer the meaning and im-
port of his faith is related to a belief in a divine creator and presence. To
that extent a religious life of faith and a similar secular life are different.
But they are not as different as one might have supposed. In fact they are
similar enough that the naturalist and the believer have a great deal of
common ground. Thus despite the rejection of a religious belief in God,
the naturalist can recognize without difficulty the character, meaning
and import of faith as a constituent of nature and of a life understood
and lived on naturalist principles.
University of ???
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